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Prior-independent mechanism
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1	5 Prior-independent Approximation In the last two chapters we discussed mechanism that performed well for a given Bayesian prior distribution. Assuming the existence of such a Bayesian prior is natural when deriving mech Add to Reading List Source URL: jasonhartline.com - Date: 2017-07-28 06:04:18
2	Prior-independent Multi-Parameter Mechanism Design Nikhil Devanur1 , Jason Hartline2 ? , Anna Karlin3 , and Thach Nguyen3 1 , Microsoft Research Add to Reading List Source URL: users.eecs.northwestern.edu - Date: 2011-09-30 18:31:24
3	Near-optimal multi-unit auctions with ordered bidders Elias Koutsoupias London Add to Reading List Source URL: www.maths.lse.ac.uk Language: English - Date: 2013-10-31 12:50:34 Auction theory Mechanism design Game theory Marketing Market economics) Auction First-price sealed-bid auction Multiunit auction Prior-independent mechanism
4	A Optimal and Robust Mechanism Design with Interdependent Values TIM ROUGHGARDEN, Stanford University INBAL TALGAM-COHEN, Stanford University We study interdependent value settings [Milgrom and Weberand extend se Add to Reading List Source URL: theory.stanford.edu Language: English - Date: 2013-12-08 09:31:37 Auction theory Game theory Mechanism design Auctions Decision theory Gaming Vickrey auction Revelation principle Auction Prior-independent mechanism English auction Incentive compatibility
5	Supply-Limiting Mechanisms TIM ROUGHGARDEN, Department of Computer Science, Stanford University INBAL TALGAM-COHEN, Department of Computer Science, Stanford University QIQI YAN, Department of Computer Science, Stanford U Add to Reading List Source URL: theory.stanford.edu Language: English - Date: 2015-11-02 19:36:35 Mechanism design Game theory Auctions Auction theory Decision theory Gaming Prior-independent mechanism VickreyClarkeGroves auction VickreyClarkeGroves mechanism Auction Multiunit auction Normal distribution
6	Supply-Limiting Mechanisms TIM ROUGHGARDEN, Department of Computer Science, Stanford University INBAL TALGAM-COHEN, Department of Computer Science, Stanford University QIQI YAN, Department of Computer Science, Stanford U Add to Reading List Source URL: www.qiqiyan.com.s3-website-us-east-1.amazonaws.com Language: English - Date: 2012-07-04 18:28:35 Mechanism design Game theory Auctions Auction theory Decision theory Gaming Prior-independent mechanism VickreyClarkeGroves auction VickreyClarkeGroves mechanism Auction Multiunit auction Normal distribution
7	Envy, Truth, and Profit ∗ Jason D. Hartline Electrical Engineering and Computer Science Add to Reading List Source URL: www.qiqiyan.com.s3-website-us-east-1.amazonaws.com Language: English - Date: 2012-07-04 18:28:34 Mechanism design Game theory Auction theory Auctions Sampling Bayesian-optimal mechanism Prior-free mechanism VickreyClarkeGroves mechanism Prior-independent mechanism Virtual valuation Vickrey auction VickreyClarkeGroves auction
8	Prior-Free Auctions with Ordered Bidders Stefano Leonardi∗ Sapienza University of Rome Via Ariosto, Rome, Italy Add to Reading List Source URL: theory.stanford.edu Language: English - Date: 2012-04-26 10:12:13 Mechanism design Auction theory Auctions Game theory Market research Auction Prior-independent mechanism Digital goods auction Prior-free mechanism Random-sampling mechanism
9	CS364A: Algorithmic Game Theory Lecture #6: Simple Near-Optimal Auctions∗ Tim Roughgarden† October 9, Add to Reading List Source URL: theory.stanford.edu Language: English - Date: 2015-09-22 16:30:12 Mechanism design Auction theory Game theory Auctions Vickrey auction Sampling Auction Sponsored search auction Virtual valuation Random-sampling mechanism Prior-independent mechanism