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Revelation principle
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1	X Bayes-Nash Approximation This text primarily focuses on the design of incentive compatible mechanisms, i.e., ones where truth telling is an equilibrium. This focus is justified in theory by the revelation principle (Se Add to Reading List Source URL: jasonhartline.com - Date: 2017-07-28 06:04:18
2	The Richard Oakes’ book, “Mary Baker Eddy’s Six Days of Revelation,” we find the following vital information: “To Mrs. Annie M. Knott, C.S.D., Principle of the Detroit Christian Science Institute, she gave warn Add to Reading List Source URL: www.mbeinstitute.org - Date: 2014-01-01 22:17:11
3	CS364A: Algorithmic Game Theory Lecture #5: Revenue-Maximizing Auctions∗ Tim Roughgarden† October 7, Add to Reading List Source URL: theory.stanford.edu Language: English - Date: 2015-09-22 16:28:39 Mechanism design Game theory Auction theory Decision theory Gaming Auctions Vickrey auction First-price sealed-bid auction Virtual valuation Auction Incentive compatibility Revelation principle
4	CS364A: Algorithmic Game Theory Lecture #4: Algorithmic Mechanism Design∗ Tim Roughgarden† October 2, Add to Reading List Source URL: theory.stanford.edu Language: English - Date: 2015-09-22 16:26:58 Game theory Mechanism design Auction theory Decision theory Gaming Revelation principle Knapsack problem Algorithmic mechanism design Vickrey auction First-price sealed-bid auction Algorithmic game theory Auction
5	Partnerships, Lemons and E¢cient Trade Karsten Fieseler Thomas Kittsteiner Benny Moldovanu¤ Add to Reading List Source URL: www.econ2.uni-bonn.de Language: English - Date: 2014-03-26 06:49:17 Game theory Mechanism design Auction theory Decision theory Gaming Information Auctions Double auction Revelation principle Mu The Market for Lemons Revenue equivalence
6	A Optimal and Robust Mechanism Design with Interdependent Values TIM ROUGHGARDEN, Stanford University INBAL TALGAM-COHEN, Stanford University We study interdependent value settings [Milgrom and Weberand extend se Add to Reading List Source URL: theory.stanford.edu Language: English - Date: 2013-12-08 09:31:37 Auction theory Game theory Mechanism design Auctions Decision theory Gaming Vickrey auction Revelation principle Auction Prior-independent mechanism English auction Incentive compatibility
7	Implementability of Correlated and Communication Equilibrium Outcomes in Incomplete Information Games Add to Reading List Source URL: faculty.biu.ac.il Language: English - Date: 2014-04-27 14:49:21 Game theory Decision theory Mathematics Bayesian game Revelation principle Correlated equilibrium Strategy Solution concept Mechanism design Outcome Incentive compatibility Intuitive criterion
8	E¢cient Design with Interdependent Valuations Philippe Jehiel and Benny Moldovanu¤ First version: January 1998, This version: February 20, 2000 Abstract Add to Reading List Source URL: www.econ2.uni-bonn.de Language: English - Date: 2014-03-26 06:49:17 Mechanism design Game theory Decision theory Gaming Mathematics Revenue equivalence Revelation principle Paul Milgrom Monotonicity Valuation Principalagent problem Incentive compatibility
9	CS364B: Frontiers in Mechanism Design Lecture #18: Multi-Parameter Revenue-Maximization∗ Tim Roughgarden† March 5, Add to Reading List Source URL: theory.stanford.edu Language: English - Date: 2014-05-13 09:36:27 Mechanism design Game theory Decision theory Auction theory Gaming Auctions Vickrey auction VickreyClarkeGroves auction Virtual valuation VickreyClarkeGroves mechanism Auction Revelation principle
10	CS364B: Frontiers in Mechanism Design Lecture #12: Bayesian Incentive-Compatibility ∗ Tim Roughgarden† Add to Reading List Source URL: theory.stanford.edu Language: English - Date: 2014-03-19 07:35:11 Game theory Mechanism design Auction theory Decision theory Gaming Auctions Revelation principle Revenue equivalence First-price sealed-bid auction Incentive compatibility Vickrey auction Nash equilibrium