Bayesian-optimal mechanism

Results: 13



#Item
1CS364B: Frontiers in Mechanism Design Lecture #8: MIR and MIDR Mechanisms∗ Tim Roughgarden† January 29,

CS364B: Frontiers in Mechanism Design Lecture #8: MIR and MIDR Mechanisms∗ Tim Roughgarden† January 29,

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Source URL: theory.stanford.edu

Language: English - Date: 2014-02-19 21:14:11
2CS264: Beyond Worst-Case Analysis Lecture #18: Pricing with an Unknown Distribution∗ Tim Roughgarden† November 19,

CS264: Beyond Worst-Case Analysis Lecture #18: Pricing with an Unknown Distribution∗ Tim Roughgarden† November 19,

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Source URL: theory.stanford.edu

Language: English - Date: 2015-01-17 16:48:13
3Revenue Maximization with a Single Sample Peerapong Dhangwatnotai∗ Department of Computer Science, Stanford University 460 Gates Building, 353 Serra

Revenue Maximization with a Single Sample Peerapong Dhangwatnotai∗ Department of Computer Science, Stanford University 460 Gates Building, 353 Serra

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Source URL: www.qiqiyan.com.s3-website-us-east-1.amazonaws.com

Language: English - Date: 2012-07-04 18:28:34
4Optimal Mechanism Design and Money Burning Jason D. Hartline∗ Tim Roughgarden†  Electrical Engineering and Computer Science

Optimal Mechanism Design and Money Burning Jason D. Hartline∗ Tim Roughgarden† Electrical Engineering and Computer Science

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Source URL: theory.stanford.edu

Language: English - Date: 2008-03-17 23:29:32
5CS364B: Exercise Set #4 Due by the beginning of class on Wednesday, February 5, 2014 Instructions: (1) Turn in your solutions to all of the following exercises directly to one of the TA (Okke). Please type your solutions

CS364B: Exercise Set #4 Due by the beginning of class on Wednesday, February 5, 2014 Instructions: (1) Turn in your solutions to all of the following exercises directly to one of the TA (Okke). Please type your solutions

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Source URL: theory.stanford.edu

Language: English - Date: 2014-01-31 23:29:10
6Auction design with endogenously correlated buyer types Daniel Kr¨ahmer∗ January 21, 2011 Abstract This paper studies optimal auction design when the seller can affect the buyers’ valuations through an unobservable

Auction design with endogenously correlated buyer types Daniel Kr¨ahmer∗ January 21, 2011 Abstract This paper studies optimal auction design when the seller can affect the buyers’ valuations through an unobservable

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Source URL: www.wiwi.uni-bonn.de

Language: English - Date: 2011-01-21 03:44:57
7Envy, Truth, and Profit ∗ Jason D. Hartline  Electrical Engineering and Computer Science

Envy, Truth, and Profit ∗ Jason D. Hartline Electrical Engineering and Computer Science

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Source URL: www.qiqiyan.com.s3-website-us-east-1.amazonaws.com

Language: English - Date: 2012-07-04 18:28:34
8Simple versus Optimal Mechanisms ∗ Jason D. Hartline  Electrical Engineering and Computer Science

Simple versus Optimal Mechanisms ∗ Jason D. Hartline Electrical Engineering and Computer Science

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Source URL: theory.stanford.edu

Language: English - Date: 2009-05-12 00:18:06
9T HEORY OF C OMPUTING, Volume), pp. 95–119 www.theoryofcomputing.org S PECIAL ISSUE IN HONOR OF R AJEEV M OTWANI  Revenue Submodularity

T HEORY OF C OMPUTING, Volume), pp. 95–119 www.theoryofcomputing.org S PECIAL ISSUE IN HONOR OF R AJEEV M OTWANI Revenue Submodularity

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Source URL: theoryofcomputing.org

Language: English - Date: 2014-11-14 13:01:36
10Non-Bayesian Optimal Search and Dynamic Implementation Alex Gershkov and Benny Moldovanu January 22, 2009  Abstract

Non-Bayesian Optimal Search and Dynamic Implementation Alex Gershkov and Benny Moldovanu January 22, 2009 Abstract

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Source URL: www.econ2.uni-bonn.de

Language: English - Date: 2014-03-26 06:49:17