Auctions

Results: 2662



#Item
1Journal of Economic Theory–282 Private information revelation in common-value auctions Vlad Maresa and Ronald M. Harstadb, a

Journal of Economic Theory–282 Private information revelation in common-value auctions Vlad Maresa and Ronald M. Harstadb, a

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Source URL: harstad.missouri.edu

Language: English - Date: 2013-05-14 12:22:42
    2Auctions plus round 3 logo

    Auctions plus round 3 logo

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    Source URL: www.lawsonsangus.com.au

    Language: English - Date: 2017-07-12 04:19:47
      3BMP Auctions: Cost-effective Watershed Management

      BMP Auctions: Cost-effective Watershed Management

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      Source URL: www.ksu-olg.info

      Language: English - Date: 2010-05-06 12:50:37
        4Nonparametric Tests for Common Values In First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions∗ Philip A. Haile† Han Hong‡

        Nonparametric Tests for Common Values In First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions∗ Philip A. Haile† Han Hong‡

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        Source URL: www.econ.yale.edu

        Language: English - Date: 2003-11-04 11:11:29
          5English Auctions with Resale: An Experimental Study Sotiris Georganas NovemberAbstract

          English Auctions with Resale: An Experimental Study Sotiris Georganas NovemberAbstract

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          Source URL: georgana.net

          Language: English - Date: 2012-02-14 15:38:58
            6Tie-breaks and bid-caps in all-pay auctions

            Tie-breaks and bid-caps in all-pay auctions

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            Source URL: polit.econ.kit.edu

            Language: English - Date: 2015-09-02 05:31:35
              7Overview of Research Marek Pycia August 2015 I am a microeconomic theorist studying market design. My research contributes to four areas of this field: matching, allocation without transfers, auctions, and the foundation

              Overview of Research Marek Pycia August 2015 I am a microeconomic theorist studying market design. My research contributes to four areas of this field: matching, allocation without transfers, auctions, and the foundation

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              Source URL: pycia.bol.ucla.edu

              Language: English - Date: 2016-09-28 14:05:24
                8EFFICIENCY IN AUCTIONS WHEN BIDDERS HAVE PRIVATE INFORMATION ABOUT COMPETIT0 RS Ronald M. Harstad, Michael H. Rothkopf, and

                EFFICIENCY IN AUCTIONS WHEN BIDDERS HAVE PRIVATE INFORMATION ABOUT COMPETIT0 RS Ronald M. Harstad, Michael H. Rothkopf, and

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                Source URL: harstad.missouri.edu

                Language: English - Date: 2013-05-14 12:22:19
                  9December 8, 2016 Errata to Kazuo Murota, Akiyoshi Shioura, and Zaifu Yang: “Time Bounds for Iterative Auctions: A Unified Approach by Discrete Convex Analysis”

                  December 8, 2016 Errata to Kazuo Murota, Akiyoshi Shioura, and Zaifu Yang: “Time Bounds for Iterative Auctions: A Unified Approach by Discrete Convex Analysis”

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                  Source URL: www.comp.tmu.ac.jp

                  - Date: 2016-12-08 08:56:43
                    10Nonparametric Tests for Common Values In First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions∗ Philip A. Haile† Han Hong‡

                    Nonparametric Tests for Common Values In First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions∗ Philip A. Haile† Han Hong‡

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                    Source URL: www.econ.yale.edu

                    Language: English - Date: 2006-11-12 20:32:36