Random-sampling mechanism

Results: 8



#Item
1Auction theory / Mechanism design / Game theory / Auctions / Marketing / Decision theory / Auction / Prior-free mechanism / Multiunit auction / Digital goods auction / Virtual valuation / Random-sampling mechanism

Prior-Free Multi-Unit Auctions with Ordered Bidders∗ Sayan Bhattacharya† Elias Koutsoupias‡ Janardhan Kulkarni§

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Source URL: theory.stanford.edu

Language: English - Date: 2014-05-17 21:55:22
2Mechanism design / Computational complexity theory / Game theory / Decision theory / VickreyClarkeGroves auction / VickreyClarkeGroves mechanism / Incentive compatibility / Knapsack problem / Randomized rounding / Time complexity / Random-sampling mechanism / Bayesian-optimal mechanism

CS364B: Frontiers in Mechanism Design Lecture #8: MIR and MIDR Mechanisms∗ Tim Roughgarden† January 29,

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Source URL: theory.stanford.edu

Language: English - Date: 2014-02-19 21:14:11
3Auction theory / Mechanism design / Auctions / Game theory / Vickrey auction / VickreyClarkeGroves auction / Auction / VickreyClarkeGroves mechanism / Matroid / Linear programming / Random-sampling mechanism

Minimizing Regret with Multiple Reserves TIM ROUGHGARDEN, Stanford University JOSHUA R. WANG, Stanford University We study the problem of computing and learning non-anonymous reserve prices to maximize revenue. We first

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Source URL: web.stanford.edu

Language: English - Date: 2016-08-08 16:20:04
4Mechanism design / Auction theory / Vickrey auction / Algorithm / Market research / Random-sampling mechanism / Bayesian-optimal mechanism

CS369N: Beyond Worst-Case Analysis Lecture #9: From Average-Case Analysis to Instance Optimality∗ Tim Roughgarden† December 4, 2009

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Source URL: theory.stanford.edu

Language: English - Date: 2011-11-11 18:36:42
5Mechanism design / Auction theory / Auctions / Game theory / Market research / Auction / Prior-independent mechanism / Digital goods auction / Prior-free mechanism / Random-sampling mechanism

Prior-Free Auctions with Ordered Bidders Stefano Leonardi∗ Sapienza University of Rome Via Ariosto, Rome, Italy

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Source URL: theory.stanford.edu

Language: English - Date: 2012-04-26 10:12:13
6Mechanism design / Auction theory / Game theory / Auctions / Vickrey auction / Sampling / Auction / Sponsored search auction / Virtual valuation / Random-sampling mechanism / Prior-independent mechanism

CS364A: Algorithmic Game Theory Lecture #6: Simple Near-Optimal Auctions∗ Tim Roughgarden† October 9,

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Source URL: theory.stanford.edu

Language: English - Date: 2015-09-22 16:30:12
7Mechanism design / Game theory / Auction theory / Auctions / Decision theory / Gaming / Vickrey auction / Auction / VickreyClarkeGroves auction / VickreyClarkeGroves mechanism / Virtual valuation / Random-sampling mechanism

Approximately Optimal Mechanism Design: Motivation, Examples, and Lessons Learned TIM ROUGHGARDEN Stanford University This survey describes the approximately optimal mechanism design paradigm and uses it to investigate

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Source URL: theory.stanford.edu

Language: English - Date: 2014-11-26 15:35:14
8Sample size determination / Simple random sample / Resampling / Sample maximum and minimum / Random sample / Bernoulli sampling / Sample / Estimation theory / Exponential mechanism / Statistics / Sampling / Statistical inference

A Dip in the Reservoir: Maintaining Sample Synopses of Evolving Datasets Rainer Gemulla Wolfgang Lehner

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Source URL: dws.informatik.uni-mannheim.de

Language: English - Date: 2014-09-29 11:40:17
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