Random-sampling mechanism

Results: 8



#Item
1Prior-Free Multi-Unit Auctions with Ordered Bidders∗ Sayan Bhattacharya† Elias Koutsoupias‡  Janardhan Kulkarni§

Prior-Free Multi-Unit Auctions with Ordered Bidders∗ Sayan Bhattacharya† Elias Koutsoupias‡ Janardhan Kulkarni§

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Source URL: theory.stanford.edu

Language: English - Date: 2014-05-17 21:55:22
2CS364B: Frontiers in Mechanism Design Lecture #8: MIR and MIDR Mechanisms∗ Tim Roughgarden† January 29,

CS364B: Frontiers in Mechanism Design Lecture #8: MIR and MIDR Mechanisms∗ Tim Roughgarden† January 29,

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Source URL: theory.stanford.edu

Language: English - Date: 2014-02-19 21:14:11
3Minimizing Regret with Multiple Reserves TIM ROUGHGARDEN, Stanford University JOSHUA R. WANG, Stanford University We study the problem of computing and learning non-anonymous reserve prices to maximize revenue. We first

Minimizing Regret with Multiple Reserves TIM ROUGHGARDEN, Stanford University JOSHUA R. WANG, Stanford University We study the problem of computing and learning non-anonymous reserve prices to maximize revenue. We first

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Source URL: web.stanford.edu

Language: English - Date: 2016-08-08 16:20:04
4CS369N: Beyond Worst-Case Analysis Lecture #9: From Average-Case Analysis to Instance Optimality∗ Tim Roughgarden† December 4, 2009

CS369N: Beyond Worst-Case Analysis Lecture #9: From Average-Case Analysis to Instance Optimality∗ Tim Roughgarden† December 4, 2009

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Source URL: theory.stanford.edu

Language: English - Date: 2011-11-11 18:36:42
5Prior-Free Auctions with Ordered Bidders Stefano Leonardi∗ Sapienza University of Rome Via Ariosto, Rome, Italy

Prior-Free Auctions with Ordered Bidders Stefano Leonardi∗ Sapienza University of Rome Via Ariosto, Rome, Italy

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Source URL: theory.stanford.edu

Language: English - Date: 2012-04-26 10:12:13
6CS364A: Algorithmic Game Theory Lecture #6: Simple Near-Optimal Auctions∗ Tim Roughgarden† October 9,

CS364A: Algorithmic Game Theory Lecture #6: Simple Near-Optimal Auctions∗ Tim Roughgarden† October 9,

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Source URL: theory.stanford.edu

Language: English - Date: 2015-09-22 16:30:12
7Approximately Optimal Mechanism Design: Motivation, Examples, and Lessons Learned TIM ROUGHGARDEN Stanford University  This survey describes the approximately optimal mechanism design paradigm and uses it to investigate

Approximately Optimal Mechanism Design: Motivation, Examples, and Lessons Learned TIM ROUGHGARDEN Stanford University This survey describes the approximately optimal mechanism design paradigm and uses it to investigate

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Source URL: theory.stanford.edu

Language: English - Date: 2014-11-26 15:35:14
8A Dip in the Reservoir: Maintaining Sample Synopses of Evolving Datasets Rainer Gemulla Wolfgang Lehner

A Dip in the Reservoir: Maintaining Sample Synopses of Evolving Datasets Rainer Gemulla Wolfgang Lehner

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Source URL: dws.informatik.uni-mannheim.de

Language: English - Date: 2014-09-29 11:40:17