VickreyClarkeGroves mechanism

Results: 65



#Item
1Equilibrium Efficiency and Price Complexity in Sponsored Search Auctions Moshe Babaioff∗ Tim Roughgarden†

Equilibrium Efficiency and Price Complexity in Sponsored Search Auctions Moshe Babaioff∗ Tim Roughgarden†

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Source URL: theory.stanford.edu

Language: English - Date: 2010-05-25 00:22:55
2Vickrey Auction  VCG Combinatorial Auctions

Vickrey Auction VCG Combinatorial Auctions

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Source URL: www-tcs.cs.uni-sb.de

Language: English - Date: 2016-03-29 17:50:24
3Distributed Algorithmic Mechanism Design: ∗ Recent Results and Future Directions †  ‡

Distributed Algorithmic Mechanism Design: ∗ Recent Results and Future Directions † ‡

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Source URL: www.cs.yale.edu

Language: English - Date: 2002-09-14 14:49:21
40 An Expressive Mechanism for Auctions on the Web ¨ PAUL DUTTING , London School of Economics and Political Science MONIKA HENZINGER, University of Vienna

0 An Expressive Mechanism for Auctions on the Web ¨ PAUL DUTTING , London School of Economics and Political Science MONIKA HENZINGER, University of Vienna

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Source URL: paulduetting.com

Language: English - Date: 2015-06-25 03:05:02
5Economics and Computation ECONand CPSCProfessor Dirk Bergemann and Professor Joan Feigenbaum Combinatorial Auctions

Economics and Computation ECONand CPSCProfessor Dirk Bergemann and Professor Joan Feigenbaum Combinatorial Auctions

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Source URL: zoo.cs.yale.edu

Language: English - Date: 2008-11-22 12:30:24
6When queueing is better than push and shove∗ Alex Gershkov and

When queueing is better than push and shove∗ Alex Gershkov and

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Source URL: pluto.huji.ac.il

Language: English - Date: 2014-02-02 05:15:06
7Mechanism Design by Creditability? Raphael Eidenbenz, Yvonne Anne Oswald, Stefan Schmid, and Roger Wattenhofer Computer Engineering and Networks Laboratory ETH Zurich, Switzerland  Abstract. This paper attends to the pro

Mechanism Design by Creditability? Raphael Eidenbenz, Yvonne Anne Oswald, Stefan Schmid, and Roger Wattenhofer Computer Engineering and Networks Laboratory ETH Zurich, Switzerland Abstract. This paper attends to the pro

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Source URL: www.tik.ee.ethz.ch

Language: English - Date: 2015-05-18 12:16:19
80 Auctions for Heterogeneous Items and Budget Limits ¨ PAUL DUTTING , Department of Mathematics, London School of Economics MONIKA HENZINGER, Faculty of Computer Science, University of Vienna

0 Auctions for Heterogeneous Items and Budget Limits ¨ PAUL DUTTING , Department of Mathematics, London School of Economics MONIKA HENZINGER, Faculty of Computer Science, University of Vienna

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Source URL: paulduetting.com

Language: English - Date: 2015-07-07 06:56:08
9Algorithmic Game Theory  Summer 2015, Week 11 Non-Truthful Mechanisms Beyond the Worst-Case Or: How Google Got So Incredibly Rich

Algorithmic Game Theory Summer 2015, Week 11 Non-Truthful Mechanisms Beyond the Worst-Case Or: How Google Got So Incredibly Rich

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Source URL: www.cadmo.ethz.ch

Language: English - Date: 2016-01-25 09:13:39
10CS364B: Frontiers in Mechanism Design Lecture #8: MIR and MIDR Mechanisms∗ Tim Roughgarden† January 29,

CS364B: Frontiers in Mechanism Design Lecture #8: MIR and MIDR Mechanisms∗ Tim Roughgarden† January 29,

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Source URL: theory.stanford.edu

Language: English - Date: 2014-02-19 21:14:11