Incentive compatibility

Results: 59



#Item
1Incentive Compatibility of Bitcoin Mining Pool Reward Functions Okke Schrijvers, Joseph Bonneau, Dan Boneh, and Tim Roughgarden Stanford University  Abstract. In this paper we introduce a game-theoretic model for reward

Incentive Compatibility of Bitcoin Mining Pool Reward Functions Okke Schrijvers, Joseph Bonneau, Dan Boneh, and Tim Roughgarden Stanford University Abstract. In this paper we introduce a game-theoretic model for reward

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Source URL: www.ifca.ai

Language: English - Date: 2016-02-08 20:23:36
2On Incentive Compatibility of Deadline Differentiated Pricing for Deferrable Demand Eilyan Bitar1 and

On Incentive Compatibility of Deadline Differentiated Pricing for Deferrable Demand Eilyan Bitar1 and

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Source URL: smart.caltech.edu

Language: English - Date: 2015-04-08 17:16:47
    3Bayesian Incentive Compatibility via Matchings Jason D. Hartline∗ Robert Kleinberg†  Abstract

    Bayesian Incentive Compatibility via Matchings Jason D. Hartline∗ Robert Kleinberg† Abstract

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    Source URL: users.eecs.northwestern.edu

    - Date: 2010-11-21 18:30:33
      4Distributed Algorithmic Mechanism Design: ∗ Recent Results and Future Directions †  ‡

      Distributed Algorithmic Mechanism Design: ∗ Recent Results and Future Directions † ‡

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      Source URL: www.cs.yale.edu

      Language: English - Date: 2002-09-14 14:49:21
      5CS364A: Algorithmic Game Theory Lecture #5: Revenue-Maximizing Auctions∗ Tim Roughgarden† October 7,

      CS364A: Algorithmic Game Theory Lecture #5: Revenue-Maximizing Auctions∗ Tim Roughgarden† October 7,

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      Source URL: theory.stanford.edu

      Language: English - Date: 2015-09-22 16:28:39
      6Abstract  Privacy, Integrity, and Incentive-Compatibility in Computations with Untrusted Parties Sheng Zhong 2004

      Abstract Privacy, Integrity, and Incentive-Compatibility in Computations with Untrusted Parties Sheng Zhong 2004

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      Source URL: cs-www.cs.yale.edu

      Language: English - Date: 2004-07-28 23:00:33
      7Strategyproof Computing: Systems Infrastructures for Self-Interested Parties Chaki Ng, David C. Parkes, and Margo Seltzer Division of Engineering and Applied Sciences Harvard University Cambridge, MA 02138

      Strategyproof Computing: Systems Infrastructures for Self-Interested Parties Chaki Ng, David C. Parkes, and Margo Seltzer Division of Engineering and Applied Sciences Harvard University Cambridge, MA 02138

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      Source URL: netecon.seas.harvard.edu

      Language: English - Date: 2009-11-30 14:32:02
      80 Auctions for Heterogeneous Items and Budget Limits ¨ PAUL DUTTING , Department of Mathematics, London School of Economics MONIKA HENZINGER, Faculty of Computer Science, University of Vienna

      0 Auctions for Heterogeneous Items and Budget Limits ¨ PAUL DUTTING , Department of Mathematics, London School of Economics MONIKA HENZINGER, Faculty of Computer Science, University of Vienna

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      Source URL: paulduetting.com

      Language: English - Date: 2015-07-07 06:56:08
      9CS364B: Frontiers in Mechanism Design Lecture #8: MIR and MIDR Mechanisms∗ Tim Roughgarden† January 29,

      CS364B: Frontiers in Mechanism Design Lecture #8: MIR and MIDR Mechanisms∗ Tim Roughgarden† January 29,

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      Source URL: theory.stanford.edu

      Language: English - Date: 2014-02-19 21:14:11
      10RANDOMIZATION AND COMPUTATION IN STRATEGIC SETTINGS A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF COMPUTER SCIENCE AND THE COMMITTEE ON GRADUATE STUDIES

      RANDOMIZATION AND COMPUTATION IN STRATEGIC SETTINGS A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF COMPUTER SCIENCE AND THE COMMITTEE ON GRADUATE STUDIES

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      Source URL: www-bcf.usc.edu

      Language: English - Date: 2011-08-30 21:00:54