1 | Add to Reading ListSource URL: theory.stanford.edu- Date: 2016-08-30 19:14:06
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2![BNE and Auction Theory Homework 1. For two agents with values U [0, 1] and U [0, 2], respectively: (a) show that the first-price auction is not socially optimal in BNE. (b) give an auction with “pay your bid if you win BNE and Auction Theory Homework 1. For two agents with values U [0, 1] and U [0, 2], respectively: (a) show that the first-price auction is not socially optimal in BNE. (b) give an auction with “pay your bid if you win](https://www.pdfsearch.io/img/26edde5edc3f5ad99d2c4f69417dfd70.jpg) | Add to Reading ListSource URL: jasonhartline.com- Date: 2017-07-28 06:04:18
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3 | Add to Reading ListSource URL: theory.stanford.edu- Date: 2013-12-22 23:37:35
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4 | Add to Reading ListSource URL: theory.stanford.edu- Date: 2014-01-27 13:39:49
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5 | Add to Reading ListSource URL: www.econ2.uni-bonn.de- Date: 2014-03-26 06:49:17
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6 | Add to Reading ListSource URL: theory.stanford.edu- Date: 2012-10-02 12:28:37
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7 | Add to Reading ListSource URL: www.amwater.comLanguage: English - Date: 2016-08-23 01:31:37
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8 | Add to Reading ListSource URL: gjs.mof.gov.cnLanguage: English - Date: 2016-04-29 02:53:06
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9 | Add to Reading ListSource URL: finmin.nic.inLanguage: English - Date: 2016-07-25 08:29:16
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10 | Add to Reading ListSource URL: www.gmcoinart.deLanguage: English - Date: 2016-04-27 08:30:52
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