Auction design with endogenously correlated buyer types Daniel Kr¨ahmer∗ January 21, 2011 Abstract This paper studies optimal auction design when the seller can affect the buyers’ valuations through an unobservable - Bayesian-optimal mechanism - Document - PDFSEARCH.IO

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	Auction design with endogenously correlated buyer types Daniel Kr¨ahmer∗ January 21, 2011 Abstract This paper studies optimal auction design when the seller can affect the buyers’ valuations through an unobservable Add to Reading List Document Date: 2011-01-21 03:44:57 Open Document File Size: 246,32 KB Share Result on Facebook

Auction design with endogenously correlated buyer types Daniel Kr¨ahmer∗ January 21, 2011 Abstract This paper studies optimal auction design when the seller can affect the buyers’ valuations through an unobservable Add to Reading List