Auction algorithm

Results: 29



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1Index Associativity, 27, 45 A-Priori Algorithm, 224, 225, 231 Attribute, 33 Accessible page, 199 Auction, 305

Index Associativity, 27, 45 A-Priori Algorithm, 224, 225, 231 Attribute, 33 Accessible page, 199 Auction, 305

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Source URL: infolab.stanford.edu

Language: English - Date: 2017-11-16 14:31:20
    2RANDOMIZATION AND COMPUTATION IN STRATEGIC SETTINGS A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF COMPUTER SCIENCE AND THE COMMITTEE ON GRADUATE STUDIES

    RANDOMIZATION AND COMPUTATION IN STRATEGIC SETTINGS A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF COMPUTER SCIENCE AND THE COMMITTEE ON GRADUATE STUDIES

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    Source URL: www-bcf.usc.edu

    Language: English - Date: 2011-08-30 21:00:54
    3Algorithms against Anarchy: Understanding Non-Truthful Mechanisms ¨ PAUL DUTTING , London School of Economics ¨ Informatik THOMAS KESSELHEIM, Max-Planck-Institut fur

    Algorithms against Anarchy: Understanding Non-Truthful Mechanisms ¨ PAUL DUTTING , London School of Economics ¨ Informatik THOMAS KESSELHEIM, Max-Planck-Institut fur

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    Source URL: paulduetting.com

    Language: English - Date: 2015-06-17 14:01:56
    4Combinatorial Auctions with Restricted Complements Ittai Abraham Microsoft Research, Silicon Valley  Moshe Babaioff Microsoft Research, Silicon Valley

    Combinatorial Auctions with Restricted Complements Ittai Abraham Microsoft Research, Silicon Valley Moshe Babaioff Microsoft Research, Silicon Valley

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    Source URL: theory.stanford.edu

    Language: English - Date: 2012-04-26 10:21:18
    5X Do Externalities Degrade GSP’s Efficiency? Tim Roughgarden, Stanford ´ Tardos, Cornell Eva

    X Do Externalities Degrade GSP’s Efficiency? Tim Roughgarden, Stanford ´ Tardos, Cornell Eva

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    Source URL: theory.stanford.edu

    Language: English - Date: 2012-06-21 14:07:51
    6Distributed Implementations of Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanisms David C. Parkes Division of Engineering and Applied Sciences, Harvard University, 33 Oxford Street, Cambridge MA 02138

    Distributed Implementations of Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanisms David C. Parkes Division of Engineering and Applied Sciences, Harvard University, 33 Oxford Street, Cambridge MA 02138

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    Source URL: www.eecs.harvard.edu

    Language: English
    7Algorithmic Mechanism Design Through the lens of Multi-unit auctions Noam Nisan  ∗

    Algorithmic Mechanism Design Through the lens of Multi-unit auctions Noam Nisan ∗

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    Source URL: www.cs.huji.ac.il

    Language: English - Date: 2014-01-21 11:29:27
    8Algorithms as Mechanisms: The Price of Anarchy of Relax-and-Round ¨ PAUL DUTTING, ETH Z¨ urich

    Algorithms as Mechanisms: The Price of Anarchy of Relax-and-Round ¨ PAUL DUTTING, ETH Z¨ urich

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    Source URL: paulduetting.com

    Language: English - Date: 2015-12-11 02:28:02
    9Algorithmic Game Theory  Summer 2015, Week 8 Incentives vs Computation ETH Z¨

    Algorithmic Game Theory Summer 2015, Week 8 Incentives vs Computation ETH Z¨

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    Source URL: www.cadmo.ethz.ch

    Language: English - Date: 2016-01-26 12:27:11
    10CS369N: Beyond Worst-Case Analysis Lecture #9: From Average-Case Analysis to Instance Optimality∗ Tim Roughgarden† December 4, 2009

    CS369N: Beyond Worst-Case Analysis Lecture #9: From Average-Case Analysis to Instance Optimality∗ Tim Roughgarden† December 4, 2009

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    Source URL: theory.stanford.edu

    Language: English - Date: 2011-11-11 18:36:42