On the Tradeoff between Economic Efficiency and Strategyproofness in Randomized Social Choice Haris Aziz Felix Brandt

Source URL: www.ifaamas.org

Proving the Incompatibility of Efficiency and Strategyproofness via SMT Solving

Source URL: www.ijcai.org

CPSC 455b: Written Homework Assignment #3 Due in class on Tuesday, April 16, 2002 These exercises are drawn from the following papers (all obtainable from http://pantheon.yale.edu/~sz38) and the related lectures and disc

Source URL: zoo.cs.yale.edu

• Game theory
• Mechanism design
• Decision theory
• Gaming
• Nash equilibrium
• Strategyproofness

Distributed Algorithmic Mechanism Design: ∗ Recent Results and Future Directions † ‡

Source URL: www.cs.yale.edu

• Mechanism design
• Game theory
• Decision theory
• Knowledge
• Academia
• Distributed algorithmic mechanism design
• Strategyproofness
• Algorithmic mechanism design
• Cost-sharing mechanism
• Incentive compatibility
• VickreyClarkeGroves mechanism
• Distributed computing

Winner-Imposing Strategyproof Mechanisms for Multiple Facility Location Games? Dimitris Fotakis and Christos Tzamos School of Electrical and Computer Engineering, National Technical University of Athens, Athens, G

Source URL: www.softlab.ntua.gr

• Game theory
• Mechanism design
• Decision theory
• Gaming
• Strategyproofness
• Mathematics
• Fourier analysis
• Generalized functions
• Rental harmony

Distributed Algorithmic Mechanism Design for Network Problems Rahul Sami Ph.D. Dissertation Defense Advisor: Joan Feigenbaum

Source URL: cs-www.cs.yale.edu

• Mechanism design
• Game theory
• Mathematics
• Academia
• Scott Shenker
• Computing
• Strategyproofness
• Algorithmic mechanism design
• Algorithmic
• Multicast
• Routing
• Joan Feigenbaum

Strategyproof Computing: Systems Infrastructures for Self-Interested Parties Chaki Ng, David C. Parkes, and Margo Seltzer Division of Engineering and Applied Sciences Harvard University Cambridge, MA 02138

Source URL: netecon.seas.harvard.edu

• Game theory
• Mechanism design
• Decision theory
• Gaming
• Information
• Vickrey auction
• Strategyproofness
• Incentive compatibility
• Grid computing
• Distributed computing
• Social peer-to-peer processes
• Algorithmic mechanism design

Approximation and Collusion in Multicast Cost Sharing 1 Aaron Archer2 Cornell University, Operations Research Dept., Ithaca, NYE-mail: and Joan Feigenbaum3 Arvind Krishnamurthy4 Rahul Sami

Source URL: cs-www.cs.yale.edu

• Mechanism design
• Game theory
• Mathematics
• Information
• Cost-sharing mechanism
• Strategyproofness
• Algorithmic mechanism design
• VickreyClarkeGroves mechanism
• Multicast
• Shortest path problem
• Algorithmic

A Payment Rules through Discriminant-Based Classifiers ¨ PAUL DUTTING , Stanford University, USA FELIX FISCHER, University of Cambridge, UK

Source URL: paulduetting.com

• Mechanism design
• Game theory
• Loss function
• Strategyproofness
• Monotonicity
• Incentive compatibility
• Revelation principle

Distributed Implementations of Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanisms David C. Parkes Division of Engineering and Applied Sciences, Harvard University, 33 Oxford Street, Cambridge MA 02138

Source URL: www.eecs.harvard.edu

• Game theory
• Mechanism design
• Distributed algorithmic mechanism design
• VickreyClarkeGroves mechanism
• Strategyproofness
• Revelation principle
• Vickrey auction
• Agent-based model
• Incentive compatibility
• Algorithm
• VickreyClarkeGroves auction
• Multi-agent system