Optimal mechanism

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16 Prior-free Mechanisms In Chapter 3 we derived optimal mechanisms for social surplus and profit. For social surplus, the surplus maximization mechanism (Definition 3.3, page 58) is optimal pointwise on all valuation pro

6 Prior-free Mechanisms In Chapter 3 we derived optimal mechanisms for social surplus and profit. For social surplus, the surplus maximization mechanism (Definition 3.3, page 58) is optimal pointwise on all valuation pro

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Source URL: jasonhartline.com

- Date: 2017-07-28 06:04:18
    23 Optimal Mechanisms In this chapter we discuss the objectives of social surplus and profit. As we will see, the economics of designing mechanisms to maximize social surplus is relatively simple. The optimal mechanism is

    3 Optimal Mechanisms In this chapter we discuss the objectives of social surplus and profit. As we will see, the economics of designing mechanisms to maximize social surplus is relatively simple. The optimal mechanism is

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    Source URL: jasonhartline.com

    - Date: 2017-07-28 06:04:18
      3Carrots and Sticks: Prizes and Punishments in Contests Benny Moldovanu, Aner Sela, Xianwen Shi April 8, 2008 Abstract We study optimal contest design in situations where the designer can reward high performance agents wi

      Carrots and Sticks: Prizes and Punishments in Contests Benny Moldovanu, Aner Sela, Xianwen Shi April 8, 2008 Abstract We study optimal contest design in situations where the designer can reward high performance agents wi

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      Source URL: www.econ2.uni-bonn.de

      Language: English - Date: 2014-03-26 06:49:17
      4Optimal Voting Schemes with Costly Information Acquisition∗ Alex Gershkov† Department of Economics, Hebrew University of Jerusalem

      Optimal Voting Schemes with Costly Information Acquisition∗ Alex Gershkov† Department of Economics, Hebrew University of Jerusalem

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      Source URL: pluto.huji.ac.il

      Language: English - Date: 2014-02-02 05:15:05
      5The Robustness of Robust Implementation Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehny, Stephen Morrisz January 21, 2011 Abstract We show that a mechanism that robustly implements optimal outcomes in a one-dimensional

      The Robustness of Robust Implementation Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehny, Stephen Morrisz January 21, 2011 Abstract We show that a mechanism that robustly implements optimal outcomes in a one-dimensional

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      Source URL: www.econ.ucla.edu

      Language: English - Date: 2013-10-01 17:14:34
      6CS364B: Frontiers in Mechanism Design Lecture #8: MIR and MIDR Mechanisms∗ Tim Roughgarden† January 29,

      CS364B: Frontiers in Mechanism Design Lecture #8: MIR and MIDR Mechanisms∗ Tim Roughgarden† January 29,

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      Source URL: theory.stanford.edu

      Language: English - Date: 2014-02-19 21:14:11
      7An optimal voting procedure when voting is costly

      An optimal voting procedure when voting is costly

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      Source URL: www.econ.ucla.edu

      Language: English - Date: 2015-09-30 20:35:02
      8CS264: Beyond Worst-Case Analysis Lecture #18: Pricing with an Unknown Distribution∗ Tim Roughgarden† November 19,

      CS264: Beyond Worst-Case Analysis Lecture #18: Pricing with an Unknown Distribution∗ Tim Roughgarden† November 19,

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      Source URL: theory.stanford.edu

      Language: English - Date: 2015-01-17 16:48:13
      9Near-optimal multi-unit auctions with ordered bidders Elias Koutsoupias London

      Near-optimal multi-unit auctions with ordered bidders Elias Koutsoupias London

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      Source URL: www.maths.lse.ac.uk

      Language: English - Date: 2013-10-31 12:50:34
      10A Optimal and Robust Mechanism Design with Interdependent Values TIM ROUGHGARDEN, Stanford University INBAL TALGAM-COHEN, Stanford University  We study interdependent value settings [Milgrom and Weberand extend se

      A Optimal and Robust Mechanism Design with Interdependent Values TIM ROUGHGARDEN, Stanford University INBAL TALGAM-COHEN, Stanford University We study interdependent value settings [Milgrom and Weberand extend se

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      Source URL: theory.stanford.edu

      Language: English - Date: 2013-12-08 09:31:37