Vickrey–Clarke–Groves auction

Results: 71



#Item
1Distributed Implementations of Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanisms David C. Parkes Division of Engineering and Applied Sciences, Harvard University, 33 Oxford Street, Cambridge MA 02138

Distributed Implementations of Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanisms David C. Parkes Division of Engineering and Applied Sciences, Harvard University, 33 Oxford Street, Cambridge MA 02138

Add to Reading List

Source URL: www.eecs.harvard.edu

Language: English
2Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science year (city), pp. numbers www.stacs-conf.org SPONSORED SEARCH, MARKET EQUILIBRIA, AND THE HUNGARIAN METHOD 1

Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science year (city), pp. numbers www.stacs-conf.org SPONSORED SEARCH, MARKET EQUILIBRIA, AND THE HUNGARIAN METHOD 1

Add to Reading List

Source URL: paulduetting.com

Language: English - Date: 2013-02-20 09:01:53
3A New Payment Rule for Core-Selecting Package Auctions∗ Aytek Erdil† Paul Klemperer‡

A New Payment Rule for Core-Selecting Package Auctions∗ Aytek Erdil† Paul Klemperer‡

Add to Reading List

Source URL: www.nuff.ox.ac.uk

Language: English - Date: 2010-10-04 14:07:34
4When Does Improved Targeting Increase Revenue? Patrick Hummel R. Preston McAfee  Google Inc.

When Does Improved Targeting Increase Revenue? Patrick Hummel R. Preston McAfee Google Inc.

Add to Reading List

Source URL: www.www2015.it

Language: English - Date: 2015-05-15 11:19:15
5Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research–47  Submitted 03/06; publishedComputationally Feasible VCG Mechanisms Noam Nisan

Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research–47 Submitted 03/06; publishedComputationally Feasible VCG Mechanisms Noam Nisan

Add to Reading List

Source URL: jair.org

Language: English - Date: 2009-08-06 19:20:37
6Auction-Based Schemes for Multipath Routing in Selfish Networks Haojie Zhou, Ka-Cheong Leung, and Victor O. K. Li Department of Electrical and Electronic Engineering The University of Hong Kong Pokfulam Road, Hong Kong,

Auction-Based Schemes for Multipath Routing in Selfish Networks Haojie Zhou, Ka-Cheong Leung, and Victor O. K. Li Department of Electrical and Electronic Engineering The University of Hong Kong Pokfulam Road, Hong Kong,

Add to Reading List

Source URL: www.eee.hku.hk

Language: English - Date: 2012-10-09 02:20:25
7Quality of Information Aware Incentive Mechanisms for Mobile Crowd Sensing Systems ∗ Haiming Jin† Lu Su§

Quality of Information Aware Incentive Mechanisms for Mobile Crowd Sensing Systems ∗ Haiming Jin† Lu Su§

Add to Reading List

Source URL: thawproject.files.wordpress.com

Language: English - Date: 2015-04-09 10:02:04
8Auction in Dynamic Environments: Incorporating the Cost Caused by Re-allocation Shigeo Matsubara NTT Communication Science Laboratories NTT Corporation 2-4 Hikaridai, Seika-cho, “Keihanna Science City”

Auction in Dynamic Environments: Incorporating the Cost Caused by Re-allocation Shigeo Matsubara NTT Communication Science Laboratories NTT Corporation 2-4 Hikaridai, Seika-cho, “Keihanna Science City”

Add to Reading List

Source URL: www.ai.soc.i.kyoto-u.ac.jp

Language: English - Date: 2014-08-06 22:27:08
9Multi-unit auctions with budget-constrained bidders Christian Borgs∗ Jennifer Chayes∗ Nicole Immorlica† ∗ Mohammad Mahdian

Multi-unit auctions with budget-constrained bidders Christian Borgs∗ Jennifer Chayes∗ Nicole Immorlica† ∗ Mohammad Mahdian

Add to Reading List

Source URL: research.microsoft.com

Language: English - Date: 2004-12-08 03:08:16
10Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research–47  Submitted 03/06; publishedComputationally Feasible VCG Mechanisms Noam Nisan

Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research–47 Submitted 03/06; publishedComputationally Feasible VCG Mechanisms Noam Nisan

Add to Reading List

Source URL: www.jair.org

Language: English - Date: 2009-08-06 19:20:37