Evolutionarily stable strategy

Results: 53



#Item
1Comparative Statics of Games Between Relatives IGAL MILCHTAICH Department of Economics, Bar-Ilan University, Ramat-Gan 52900, Israel E-mail:  Web Page: http://faculty.biu.ac.il/~milchti

Comparative Statics of Games Between Relatives IGAL MILCHTAICH Department of Economics, Bar-Ilan University, Ramat-Gan 52900, Israel E-mail: Web Page: http://faculty.biu.ac.il/~milchti

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Source URL: faculty.biu.ac.il

Language: English - Date: 2012-06-24 02:01:47
2doi:j.jtbi

doi:j.jtbi

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Source URL: octavia.zoology.washington.edu

Language: English - Date: 2007-04-23 01:20:10
3MIMS Technical Report No)  Evolution of learning abilities: A theoretical model Wataru Nakahashi

MIMS Technical Report No) Evolution of learning abilities: A theoretical model Wataru Nakahashi

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Source URL: www.mims.meiji.ac.jp

Language: English - Date: 2015-04-16 22:07:25
4Prepared with SEVIS LI D S E Evolutionary Games - Winter 2005 Chapter 1 From Evolutionary Biology to Game Theory

Prepared with SEVIS LI D S E Evolutionary Games - Winter 2005 Chapter 1 From Evolutionary Biology to Game Theory

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Source URL: www.homepages.ucl.ac.uk

Language: English - Date: 2015-05-12 11:17:41
5Preference Evolution, Two-Speed Dynamics, and Rapid Social Change* William H. Sandholm Department of Economics University of Wisconsin

Preference Evolution, Two-Speed Dynamics, and Rapid Social Change* William H. Sandholm Department of Economics University of Wisconsin

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Source URL: www.ssc.wisc.edu

Language: English - Date: 2001-05-15 16:01:28
6Economics Letters–50  Some relationships between evolutionary stability criteria in games Martin Dufwenberg a

Economics Letters–50 Some relationships between evolutionary stability criteria in games Martin Dufwenberg a

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Source URL: www.u.arizona.edu

Language: English - Date: 2003-10-09 20:26:58
7Between cheap and costly signals: the evolution of partially honest communication rspb.royalsocietypublishing.org  Kevin J. S. Zollman1, Carl T. Bergstrom2,3 and Simon M. Huttegger4

Between cheap and costly signals: the evolution of partially honest communication rspb.royalsocietypublishing.org Kevin J. S. Zollman1, Carl T. Bergstrom2,3 and Simon M. Huttegger4

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Source URL: www.andrew.cmu.edu

Language: English - Date: 2014-12-10 11:49:54
8Analysis of Adaptive Incentive Protocols for P2P Networks

Analysis of Adaptive Incentive Protocols for P2P Networks

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Source URL: www.cs.cuhk.hk

Language: English - Date: 2009-06-10 21:02:18
9An Economic Theory of the Evolutionary Origin of Property Rights Mukesh Eswaran and Hugh M. Neary University of British Columbia October 2011 ABSTRACT

An Economic Theory of the Evolutionary Origin of Property Rights Mukesh Eswaran and Hugh M. Neary University of British Columbia October 2011 ABSTRACT

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Source URL: econ.sites.olt.ubc.ca

Language: English - Date: 2013-05-17 12:49:29
10Multiagent Systems: Algorithmic, Game-Theoretic, and Logical Foundations

Multiagent Systems: Algorithmic, Game-Theoretic, and Logical Foundations

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Source URL: www.masfoundations.org

Language: English - Date: 2011-09-28 03:29:32