Coordination game

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1Chapter Three: Static Games* Game-theoretic modeling often begins with the simplest of structures, either in extensive or in normal form. Such simple structures are meant to define the players, their available actions an

Chapter Three: Static Games* Game-theoretic modeling often begins with the simplest of structures, either in extensive or in normal form. Such simple structures are meant to define the players, their available actions an

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Source URL: userwww.sfsu.edu

Language: English - Date: 2015-07-29 19:04:48
2OXFORD REVIEW OF ECONOMIC POLICY, VOL. 18, NO. 4  EXCHANGE-RATE ATTACK AS A COORDINATION GAME: THEORY AND EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE FRANK HEINEMANN

OXFORD REVIEW OF ECONOMIC POLICY, VOL. 18, NO. 4 EXCHANGE-RATE ATTACK AS A COORDINATION GAME: THEORY AND EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE FRANK HEINEMANN

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Source URL: www.macroeconomics.tu-berlin.de

Language: English - Date: 2008-11-06 16:24:21
3A Model of Protests, Revolution, and Information Salvador Barbera and Matthew O. Jackson ∗  May 2016

A Model of Protests, Revolution, and Information Salvador Barbera and Matthew O. Jackson ∗ May 2016

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Source URL: thred.devecon.org

Language: English - Date: 2016-05-27 10:38:33
4Microsoft Word - online_appendix_AER_f37.doc

Microsoft Word - online_appendix_AER_f37.doc

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Source URL: cess.nyu.edu

Language: English - Date: 2010-06-08 08:08:24
5Discussion Paper NoBelieving when Credible: Talking about Future Plans and Past Actions Karl H. Schlag* Péter Vida**

Discussion Paper NoBelieving when Credible: Talking about Future Plans and Past Actions Karl H. Schlag* Péter Vida**

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Source URL: www.sfbtr15.de

Language: English - Date: 2015-09-17 09:28:36
6Comparative Statics of Games Between Relatives IGAL MILCHTAICH Department of Economics, Bar-Ilan University, Ramat-Gan 52900, Israel E-mail:  Web Page: http://faculty.biu.ac.il/~milchti

Comparative Statics of Games Between Relatives IGAL MILCHTAICH Department of Economics, Bar-Ilan University, Ramat-Gan 52900, Israel E-mail: Web Page: http://faculty.biu.ac.il/~milchti

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Source URL: faculty.biu.ac.il

Language: English - Date: 2012-06-24 02:01:47
7Speculative Attacks and Financial Architecture: Experimental Analysis of Coordination Games with Public and Private Information* Frank Heinemanna, Rosemarie Nagelb and Peter Ockenfelsc First version 7. August 2001.

Speculative Attacks and Financial Architecture: Experimental Analysis of Coordination Games with Public and Private Information* Frank Heinemanna, Rosemarie Nagelb and Peter Ockenfelsc First version 7. August 2001.

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Source URL: www.macroeconomics.tu-berlin.de

Language: English - Date: 2011-04-12 09:46:06
8Coordination under Limited Depth of Reasoning Terri Kneeland∗ November 4th, 2015 Abstract This paper provides the first unified explanation of behavior in coordinated

Coordination under Limited Depth of Reasoning Terri Kneeland∗ November 4th, 2015 Abstract This paper provides the first unified explanation of behavior in coordinated

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Source URL: terri.microeconomics.ca

Language: English - Date: 2015-11-10 07:36:30
9Econometrica, Vol. 72, No. 5 (September, 2004), 1583–1599  THE THEORY OF GLOBAL GAMES ON TEST: EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS OF COORDINATION GAMES WITH PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INFORMATION BY FRANK HEINEMANN, ROSEMARIE NAGEL, AND PE

Econometrica, Vol. 72, No. 5 (September, 2004), 1583–1599 THE THEORY OF GLOBAL GAMES ON TEST: EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS OF COORDINATION GAMES WITH PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INFORMATION BY FRANK HEINEMANN, ROSEMARIE NAGEL, AND PE

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Source URL: www.macroeconomics.tu-berlin.de

Language: English - Date: 2008-11-06 16:20:57
10Journal of International Economics–450 www.elsevier.com / locate / econbase Speculative attacks: unique equilibrium and transparency Frank Heinemann*, Gerhard Illing Ludwig–Maximilians–Univ. Munchen,

Journal of International Economics–450 www.elsevier.com / locate / econbase Speculative attacks: unique equilibrium and transparency Frank Heinemann*, Gerhard Illing Ludwig–Maximilians–Univ. Munchen,

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Source URL: www.macroeconomics.tu-berlin.de

Language: English - Date: 2008-11-06 16:20:47