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Between cheap and costly signals: the evolution of partially honest communication rspb.royalsocietypublishing.org Kevin J. S. Zollman1, Carl T. Bergstrom2,3 and Simon M. Huttegger4
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Document Date: 2014-12-10 11:49:54


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Santa Fe / New York / /

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Oxford University Press / Princeton University Press / Cambridge University Press / MIT Press / Horn AG / /

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Sante Fe Institute / University of Washington / Carnegie Mellon University / University of California / /

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putative costly signal systems / /

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Department of Logic and Philosophy of Science / Cambridge University / USA Department of Biology / National Science Foundation / MIT / Department of Philosophy / Princeton University / Carnegie Mellon University / Pittsburgh / University of Washington / Seattle / Oxford University / University of California / Irvine / Royal Society / Sante Fe Institute / /

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Maynard Smith / Nat / Kevin J. S. Zollman / Philip Sidney / /

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New Mexico / Pennsylvania / California / Washington / /

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