Subgame

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1SUBGAME-PERFECT IMPLEMENTATION UNDER INFORMATION PERTURBATIONS* We consider the robustness of extensive form mechanisms to deviations from common knowledge about the state of nature, which we refer to as information pert

SUBGAME-PERFECT IMPLEMENTATION UNDER INFORMATION PERTURBATIONS* We consider the robustness of extensive form mechanisms to deviations from common knowledge about the state of nature, which we refer to as information pert

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Source URL: www.pse.ens.fr

- Date: 2013-01-05 07:18:03
    2Chapter Three: Static Games* Game-theoretic modeling often begins with the simplest of structures, either in extensive or in normal form. Such simple structures are meant to define the players, their available actions an

    Chapter Three: Static Games* Game-theoretic modeling often begins with the simplest of structures, either in extensive or in normal form. Such simple structures are meant to define the players, their available actions an

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    Source URL: userwww.sfsu.edu

    Language: English - Date: 2015-07-29 19:04:48
    3Discussion Paper NoBelieving when Credible: Talking about Future Plans and Past Actions Karl H. Schlag* Péter Vida**

    Discussion Paper NoBelieving when Credible: Talking about Future Plans and Past Actions Karl H. Schlag* Péter Vida**

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    Source URL: www.sfbtr15.de

    Language: English - Date: 2015-09-17 09:28:36
    4Selfconfirming Equilibrium and Model Uncertainty∗ P. Battigalli S. Cerreia-Vioglio F. Maccheroni M. Marinacci† July 18, 2013  ∗

    Selfconfirming Equilibrium and Model Uncertainty∗ P. Battigalli S. Cerreia-Vioglio F. Maccheroni M. Marinacci† July 18, 2013 ∗

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    Source URL: www.istfin.eco.usi.ch

    Language: English - Date: 2014-03-06 03:29:56
    5The RAND Corporation  Strategic Nonparticipation Author(s): Philippe Jehiel and Benny Moldovanu Source: The RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 27, No. 1 (Spring, 1996), ppPublished by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf

    The RAND Corporation Strategic Nonparticipation Author(s): Philippe Jehiel and Benny Moldovanu Source: The RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 27, No. 1 (Spring, 1996), ppPublished by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf

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    Source URL: www.econ2.uni-bonn.de

    Language: English - Date: 2014-03-26 06:49:17
    6Crowding Games are Sequentially Solvable

    Crowding Games are Sequentially Solvable

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    Source URL: faculty.biu.ac.il

    Language: English - Date: 2012-06-23 16:23:30
    7Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting  Page 1 Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting

    Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting Page 1 Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting

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    Source URL: www.virtualperfection.com

    Language: English - Date: 2010-04-18 23:59:21
    8CPSCECON, Fall 2011 Solution Set for Exam 2 Question 1: (a) Let G = (V, E, t) be a trust graph, as the term is defined in Section 27.5, and let v0 be a distinguished “start node.” See “Definitio

    CPSCECON, Fall 2011 Solution Set for Exam 2 Question 1: (a) Let G = (V, E, t) be a trust graph, as the term is defined in Section 27.5, and let v0 be a distinguished “start node.” See “Definitio

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    Source URL: zoo.cs.yale.edu

    Language: English - Date: 2011-12-22 14:05:18
    9Theorizing about thinking has become fashionable in economics

    Theorizing about thinking has become fashionable in economics

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    Source URL: people.hss.caltech.edu

    Language: English - Date: 2003-04-15 10:38:57
    10Course:  Game Theory Faculty:

    Course: Game Theory Faculty:

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    Source URL: idea.uab.es

    Language: English - Date: 2016-07-22 06:27:54