Folk theorem

Results: 44



#Item
1OXFORD REVIEW OF ECONOMIC POLICY, VOL. 18, NO. 4  EXCHANGE-RATE ATTACK AS A COORDINATION GAME: THEORY AND EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE FRANK HEINEMANN

OXFORD REVIEW OF ECONOMIC POLICY, VOL. 18, NO. 4 EXCHANGE-RATE ATTACK AS A COORDINATION GAME: THEORY AND EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE FRANK HEINEMANN

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Source URL: www.macroeconomics.tu-berlin.de

Language: English - Date: 2008-11-06 16:24:21
2Speculative Attacks and Financial Architecture: Experimental Analysis of Coordination Games with Public and Private Information* Frank Heinemanna, Rosemarie Nagelb and Peter Ockenfelsc First version 7. August 2001.

Speculative Attacks and Financial Architecture: Experimental Analysis of Coordination Games with Public and Private Information* Frank Heinemanna, Rosemarie Nagelb and Peter Ockenfelsc First version 7. August 2001.

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Source URL: www.macroeconomics.tu-berlin.de

Language: English - Date: 2011-04-12 09:46:06
3Crowding Games are Sequentially Solvable

Crowding Games are Sequentially Solvable

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Source URL: faculty.biu.ac.il

Language: English - Date: 2012-06-23 16:23:30
4Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting  Page 1 Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting

Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting Page 1 Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting

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Source URL: www.virtualperfection.com

Language: English - Date: 2010-04-18 23:59:21
5Weighted Congestion Games With Separable Preferences

Weighted Congestion Games With Separable Preferences

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Source URL: faculty.biu.ac.il

Language: English - Date: 2009-04-01 03:26:35
61  Punishment in Selfish Wireless Networks: A Game Theoretic Analysis Dave Levin Abstract— In currently deployed wireless networks, rational

1 Punishment in Selfish Wireless Networks: A Game Theoretic Analysis Dave Levin Abstract— In currently deployed wireless networks, rational

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Source URL: netecon.seas.harvard.edu

Language: English - Date: 2009-12-16 17:13:12
7Mechanisms with Unique Learnable Equilibria ¨ PAUL DUTTING , Stanford University THOMAS KESSELHEIM, Cornell University ´

Mechanisms with Unique Learnable Equilibria ¨ PAUL DUTTING , Stanford University THOMAS KESSELHEIM, Cornell University ´

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Source URL: paulduetting.com

Language: English - Date: 2014-04-23 11:54:36
8Course:  Game Theory Faculty:

Course: Game Theory Faculty:

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Source URL: idea.uab.es

Language: English - Date: 2016-07-22 06:27:54
9Econometrica, Vol. 72, No. 5 (September, 2004), 1583–1599  THE THEORY OF GLOBAL GAMES ON TEST: EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS OF COORDINATION GAMES WITH PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INFORMATION BY FRANK HEINEMANN, ROSEMARIE NAGEL, AND PE

Econometrica, Vol. 72, No. 5 (September, 2004), 1583–1599 THE THEORY OF GLOBAL GAMES ON TEST: EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS OF COORDINATION GAMES WITH PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INFORMATION BY FRANK HEINEMANN, ROSEMARIE NAGEL, AND PE

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Source URL: www.macroeconomics.tu-berlin.de

Language: English - Date: 2008-11-06 16:20:57
10Econ. Theory 7, Econom/c Theory

Econ. Theory 7, Econom/c Theory

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Source URL: www.econ2.uni-bonn.de

Language: English - Date: 2014-03-26 06:49:17