Subgame perfect equilibrium

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1Chapter Three: Static Games* Game-theoretic modeling often begins with the simplest of structures, either in extensive or in normal form. Such simple structures are meant to define the players, their available actions an

Chapter Three: Static Games* Game-theoretic modeling often begins with the simplest of structures, either in extensive or in normal form. Such simple structures are meant to define the players, their available actions an

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Source URL: userwww.sfsu.edu

Language: English - Date: 2015-07-29 19:04:48
2Discussion Paper NoBelieving when Credible: Talking about Future Plans and Past Actions Karl H. Schlag* Péter Vida**

Discussion Paper NoBelieving when Credible: Talking about Future Plans and Past Actions Karl H. Schlag* Péter Vida**

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Source URL: www.sfbtr15.de

Language: English - Date: 2015-09-17 09:28:36
3The RAND Corporation  Strategic Nonparticipation Author(s): Philippe Jehiel and Benny Moldovanu Source: The RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 27, No. 1 (Spring, 1996), ppPublished by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf

The RAND Corporation Strategic Nonparticipation Author(s): Philippe Jehiel and Benny Moldovanu Source: The RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 27, No. 1 (Spring, 1996), ppPublished by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf

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Source URL: www.econ2.uni-bonn.de

Language: English - Date: 2014-03-26 06:49:17
4Crowding Games are Sequentially Solvable

Crowding Games are Sequentially Solvable

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Source URL: faculty.biu.ac.il

Language: English - Date: 2012-06-23 16:23:30
5Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting  Page 1 Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting

Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting Page 1 Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting

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Source URL: www.virtualperfection.com

Language: English - Date: 2010-04-18 23:59:21
6CPSCECON, Fall 2011 Solution Set for Exam 2 Question 1: (a) Let G = (V, E, t) be a trust graph, as the term is defined in Section 27.5, and let v0 be a distinguished “start node.” See “Definitio

CPSCECON, Fall 2011 Solution Set for Exam 2 Question 1: (a) Let G = (V, E, t) be a trust graph, as the term is defined in Section 27.5, and let v0 be a distinguished “start node.” See “Definitio

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Source URL: zoo.cs.yale.edu

Language: English - Date: 2011-12-22 14:05:18
7Theorizing about thinking has become fashionable in economics

Theorizing about thinking has become fashionable in economics

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Source URL: people.hss.caltech.edu

Language: English - Date: 2003-04-15 10:38:57
8Course:  Game Theory Faculty:

Course: Game Theory Faculty:

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Source URL: idea.uab.es

Language: English - Date: 2016-07-22 06:27:54
9Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in Extensive-Form Games  Page 1 Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in ExtensiveForm Games Ù

Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in Extensive-Form Games Page 1 Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in ExtensiveForm Games Ù

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Source URL: www.virtualperfection.com

Language: English - Date: 2010-04-18 23:59:28
10

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Source URL: www.econ2.uni-bonn.de

Language: English - Date: 2014-03-26 06:49:17