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Subgame
Results: 168

#	Item
31	Whither Game Theory? Drew Fudenberg† ∗ David K. Levine‡ Add to Reading List Source URL: levine.sscnet.ucla.edu Language: English - Date: 2016-03-12 03:25:53 Game theory Non-cooperative games Nash equilibrium Subgame perfect equilibrium Solution concept Subgame Economic equilibrium Trembling hand perfect equilibrium Extensive-form game Macroeconomic model Coordination game Zero-sum game
32	Leadership with Commitment to Mixed Strategies∗ Bernhard von Stengel Department of Mathematics, London School of Economics, Houghton St, London WC2A 2AE, United Kingdom email: Add to Reading List Source URL: www.cdam.lse.ac.uk Language: English - Date: 2004-08-30 10:00:02 Game theory Non-cooperative games Nash equilibrium Trembling hand perfect equilibrium Solution concept Subgame perfect equilibrium Best response Matching pennies Bimatrix game Normal-form game Outcome Subgame
33	SS 201b Syllabus (1) Extensive form games with perfect information. • Equilibria. • Zermelo’s Theorem. • The one deviation principle. • Backward induction. Add to Reading List Source URL: people.hss.caltech.edu Language: English - Date: 2016-06-13 13:31:44 Game theory Solution concept Subgame perfect equilibrium Nash equilibrium Bayesian game Subgame Folk theorem Bayesian Repeated game Extensive-form game Sequential equilibrium
34	Prepared with SEVIS LI D S E Microeconomics II - Winter 2006 Chapter 2 Games in Extensive Form - Subgame-perfect Add to Reading List Source URL: www.homepages.ucl.ac.uk Language: English - Date: 2015-05-12 11:18:25
35	Behavioral Limitations of Subgame-Perfect Implementation Ernst Fehr Michael Powell Add to Reading List Source URL: www.tomwilkening.com Language: English - Date: 2016-06-05 05:04:43
36	Solving Imperfect Information Games Using Decomposition Neil Burch, Michael Johanson and Michael Bowling Computing Science Department, University of Alberta {nburch,johanson,mbowling}@ualberta.ca Abstract Add to Reading List Source URL: poker.cs.ualberta.ca Language: English - Date: 2014-06-09 17:40:22 Game theory Subgame Solution concept Extensive-form game Nash equilibrium Information set Epsilon-equilibrium Strategy Subgame perfect equilibrium Bayesian game
37	The Role of Bounded Rationality and Imperfect Information in Subgame Perfect Implementation - An Empirical Investigation Philippe Aghion, Ernst Fehr, Richard Holden, Tom Wilkening∗ August 4, 2015 Add to Reading List Source URL: www.tomwilkening.com Language: English - Date: 2016-06-05 05:04:43
38	Centralizing information in networks Add to Reading List Source URL: www.jeanne-hagenbach.fr Language: English - Date: 2010-09-21 19:30:53 Solution concept Determinacy Trembling hand perfect equilibrium Bayesian game Manipulated Nash equilibrium Game theory Nash equilibrium Subgame
39	Subgame Perfect Implementation under Approximate Common Knowledge: Evidence from a Laboratory Experiment∗ Philippe Aghion, Ernst Fehr, Richard Holden, Tom Wilkening July 1, 2012 Add to Reading List Source URL: research.economics.unsw.edu.au - Date: 2014-01-21 15:04:55
40	SUBGAME-PERFECT IMPLEMENTATION UNDER INFORMATION PERTURBATIONS* We consider the robustness of extensive form mechanisms to deviations from common knowledge about the state of nature, which we refer to as information pert Add to Reading List Source URL: research.economics.unsw.edu.au Language: English - Date: 2014-01-20 21:58:47

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