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Source URL: www.econ2.uni-bonn.de

Language: English - Date: 2014-03-26 06:49:17
22Chapter One: The Concepts of Game Theory* 1.1 Introduction Game Theory is the science of strategy. It is a mathematical construct with a clear set of concepts and assumptions and their resulting theorems. And, just like

Chapter One: The Concepts of Game Theory* 1.1 Introduction Game Theory is the science of strategy. It is a mathematical construct with a clear set of concepts and assumptions and their resulting theorems. And, just like

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Source URL: userwww.sfsu.edu

Language: English - Date: 2015-09-26 21:16:14
23Strategies in Extensive-Form Games  Page 1 Strategies in Extensive-Form Games

Strategies in Extensive-Form Games Page 1 Strategies in Extensive-Form Games

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Source URL: www.virtualperfection.com

Language: English - Date: 2010-04-18 23:59:17
24Markov Equilibria in Dynamic Matching and Bargaining Games1 Douglas Gale (corresponding author ) Department of Economics New York University 269 Mercer Street

Markov Equilibria in Dynamic Matching and Bargaining Games1 Douglas Gale (corresponding author ) Department of Economics New York University 269 Mercer Street

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Source URL: www.econ.nyu.edu

Language: English - Date: 2004-11-02 14:22:53
25ELSEWIER  Journal of Mathematical Economics548 Core implementation and increasing returns to scale for cooperation

ELSEWIER Journal of Mathematical Economics548 Core implementation and increasing returns to scale for cooperation

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Source URL: www.econ2.uni-bonn.de

Language: English - Date: 2014-03-26 06:49:17
26A COGNITIVE HIERARCHY MODEL OF GAMES1  Colin F. Camerer Teck-Hua Ho

A COGNITIVE HIERARCHY MODEL OF GAMES1 Colin F. Camerer Teck-Hua Ho

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Source URL: people.hss.caltech.edu

Language: English - Date: 2004-02-24 15:32:28
27Timing and Virtual Observability in Ultimatum Bargaining and “Weak Link” Coordination Games Roberto A. Weber* Department of Social and Decision Sciences Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh PA 15213

Timing and Virtual Observability in Ultimatum Bargaining and “Weak Link” Coordination Games Roberto A. Weber* Department of Social and Decision Sciences Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh PA 15213

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Source URL: people.hss.caltech.edu

Language: English - Date: 2003-05-01 11:34:36
28Extensive-Form Solution Concepts  Page 1 Extensive-Form Solution Concepts

Extensive-Form Solution Concepts Page 1 Extensive-Form Solution Concepts

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Source URL: www.virtualperfection.com

Language: English - Date: 2010-04-18 23:59:19
29Repeated Games  Page 1 Repeated Games

Repeated Games Page 1 Repeated Games

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Source URL: www.virtualperfection.com

Language: English - Date: 2010-04-18 23:59:20
30SS 201b, Homework 1 Due Tuesday, January 12th Collaboration on homework is encouraged, but individually written solutions are required. Please name all collaborators and sources of information on each assignment. Any suc

SS 201b, Homework 1 Due Tuesday, January 12th Collaboration on homework is encouraged, but individually written solutions are required. Please name all collaborators and sources of information on each assignment. Any suc

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Source URL: people.hss.caltech.edu

Language: English - Date: 2016-06-13 13:31:38