Crowding Games are Sequentially Solvable

First Page		Document Content
Date: 2012-06-23 16:23:30 Game theory Mathematics Nash equilibrium Subgame perfect equilibrium Subgame Trembling hand perfect equilibrium Extensive-form game Backward induction Potential game Normal-form game Folk theorem		Crowding Games are Sequentially Solvable Add to Reading List Source URL: faculty.biu.ac.il Download Document from Source Website File Size: 138,93 KB Share Document on Facebook

	Beyond the Nash Equilibrium Barrier ´ Tardos1 Robert Kleinberg1 Katrina Ligett1 Georgios Piliouras2 Eva Department of Computer Science, Cornell University, Ithaca NYDepartment of Electrical Engineering, Georg DocID: 1vmii - View Document
	Nash Equilibrium Computation in Subnetwork Zero-Sum Games with Switching Communications DocID: 1v8mF - View Document
	Existence, Convergence and Efficiency Analysis of Nash Equilibrium and Its Application to Traffic Networks Lihua Xie School of Electrical and Electronic Engineering Nanyang Technological University, Singapore DocID: 1v2mK - View Document
	Distributed Nash Equilibrium Seeking via the Alternating Direction Method of Multipliers Farzad Salehisadaghiani ∗ Lacra Pavel ∗ arXiv:1612.00414v1 [cs.SY] 1 Dec 2016 DocID: 1uiem - View Document
	2010 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Conference on Web Intelligence and Intelligent Agent Technology Local Search Methods for Finding a Nash Equilibrium in Two-Player Games Sofia Ceppi, Nicola Gatti, Giorgio Patrini, Marco R DocID: 1tNWM - View Document