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Game theory / Subgame perfect equilibrium / Subgame / Extensive-form game / Information set / Solution concept / Nash equilibrium / Normal-form game / Backward induction / Strategy / Best response / Folk theorem
Date: 2010-04-18 23:59:19
Game theory
Subgame perfect equilibrium
Subgame
Extensive-form game
Information set
Solution concept
Nash equilibrium
Normal-form game
Backward induction
Strategy
Best response
Folk theorem

Extensive-Form Solution Concepts Page 1 Extensive-Form Solution Concepts

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