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Results: 168



#Item
41UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN  DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS MICROECONOMIC THEORY Prelim Exam

UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS MICROECONOMIC THEORY Prelim Exam

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Source URL: www.econ.wisc.edu

Language: English - Date: 2007-06-01 10:25:19
42The Evolution of Strategic Sophistication* Nikolaus Robalino Arthur J. Robson December 2, 2014 Abstract. This paper investigates the evolutionary foundation for our ability to attribute preferences to others, an ability

The Evolution of Strategic Sophistication* Nikolaus Robalino Arthur J. Robson December 2, 2014 Abstract. This paper investigates the evolutionary foundation for our ability to attribute preferences to others, an ability

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Source URL: econ.ucsb.edu

Language: English - Date: 2015-04-13 11:35:05
43MARTIN DUFWENBERG and JOHAN LINDI~N  INCONSISTENCIES IN EXTENSIVE GAMES Common Knowledge Is Not the Issue

MARTIN DUFWENBERG and JOHAN LINDI~N INCONSISTENCIES IN EXTENSIVE GAMES Common Knowledge Is Not the Issue

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Source URL: www.u.arizona.edu

Language: English - Date: 2007-04-24 20:26:19
44PII:

PII:

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Source URL: www.princeton.edu

Language: English - Date: 2012-05-22 16:36:32
45April 21, :58 WSPC/INSTRUCTION FILE  main International Journal of Foundations of Computer Science c World Scientific Publishing Company

April 21, :58 WSPC/INSTRUCTION FILE main International Journal of Foundations of Computer Science c World Scientific Publishing Company

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Source URL: files.oliverfriedmann.de

Language: English - Date: 2012-02-10 07:43:22
46The Tragedy of the Commons in a Violent World Petros G. Sekeris∗ Abstract Earlier research has shown that the tragedy of the commons may be resolved by Folk theorems for dynamic games. In this article we graft on a sta

The Tragedy of the Commons in a Violent World Petros G. Sekeris∗ Abstract Earlier research has shown that the tragedy of the commons may be resolved by Folk theorems for dynamic games. In this article we graft on a sta

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Source URL: petros.sekeris.org

Language: English - Date: 2013-12-04 10:20:55
47arXiv:1402.2801v1 [cs.GT] 12 FebA N A NTI -F OLK T HEOREM FOR L ARGE R EPEATED G AMES WITH I MPERFECT M ONITORING∗ M ALLESH M. PAI†

arXiv:1402.2801v1 [cs.GT] 12 FebA N A NTI -F OLK T HEOREM FOR L ARGE R EPEATED G AMES WITH I MPERFECT M ONITORING∗ M ALLESH M. PAI†

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Source URL: arxiv.org

Language: English - Date: 2014-02-12 20:18:49
48The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information Drew Fudenberg; Eric Maskin Econometrica, Vol. 54, No. 3. (May, 1986), ppStable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=

The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information Drew Fudenberg; Eric Maskin Econometrica, Vol. 54, No. 3. (May, 1986), ppStable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=

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Source URL: scholar.harvard.edu

Language: English - Date: 2013-02-05 00:14:30
49Games and Economic Behavior–264 www.elsevier.com/locate/geb Evolutionary dynamics and backward induction Sergiu Hart Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Department of Economics,

Games and Economic Behavior–264 www.elsevier.com/locate/geb Evolutionary dynamics and backward induction Sergiu Hart Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Department of Economics,

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Source URL: www.ma.huji.ac.il

Language: English - Date: 2002-12-24 17:42:38
50Nash	
  Equilibrium	
   (for	
  the	
  Palgrave	
  Encyclopedia	
  of	
  Strategic	
  Management)	
   Author:	
  Joshua	
  Gans	
   Abstract:	
   This	
  entry	
  defines	
  the	
  concept	
  of	
  a

Nash  Equilibrium   (for  the  Palgrave  Encyclopedia  of  Strategic  Management)   Author:  Joshua  Gans   Abstract:   This  entry  defines  the  concept  of  a

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Source URL: www.digitopoly.org

Language: English - Date: 2015-05-24 10:29:19