Is Efficiency Expensive? Tim Roughgarden ∗ †

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Date: 2007-05-10 18:02:29 Auction theory Mechanism design Auctions Game theory Sampling Vickrey auction Revenue equivalence Auction Sponsored search auction Virtual valuation English auction Uniform distribution		Is Efficiency Expensive? Tim Roughgarden ∗ † Add to Reading List Source URL: theory.stanford.edu Download Document from Source Website File Size: 133,90 KB Share Document on Facebook

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