The Local Best Response Criterion: An Epistemic Approach to Equilibrium Refinement Herbert Gintis May 2, 2008 Abstract

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Date: 2008-05-01 20:54:48 Sequential equilibrium Trembling hand perfect equilibrium Solution concept Bayesian game Subgame Centipede game Non-credible threat Extensive-form game Best response Game theory Problem solving Nash equilibrium		The Local Best Response Criterion: An Epistemic Approach to Equilibrium Refinement Herbert Gintis May 2, 2008 Abstract Add to Reading List Source URL: www.umass.edu Download Document from Source Website File Size: 165,41 KB Share Document on Facebook

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