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Nash equilibrium / Sequential equilibrium / Trembling hand perfect equilibrium / Bayesian game / Subgame / Centipede game / Non-credible threat / Best response / Strategy / Game theory / Problem solving / Solution concept


The Local Best Response Criterion: An Epistemic Approach to Equilibrium Refinement Herbert Gintis February 6, 2009 Abstract
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Document Date: 2009-02-06 10:39:21

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Company

Wilson / Bob / /

Country

United States / /

Facility

Santa Fe Institute / Central European University / /

Organization

European Science Foundation / Santa Fe Institute / Central European University / /

Person

Fernando Vega-Redondo / Jeffrey Ely / Larry Samuelson / Robert Aumann / Binmore / Alice Alice / Nash equiAlice / Herbert Gintis / /

Position

uneducated high quality worker / If player / uneducated low quality worker / player error / uneducated worker / player / high quality worker / unskilled worker / skilled worker / low quality worker / /

Product

Carlsson / /

Technology

3g / /

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