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Sequential equilibrium / Trembling hand perfect equilibrium / Solution concept / Bayesian game / Subgame / Centipede game / Non-credible threat / Extensive-form game / Best response / Game theory / Problem solving / Nash equilibrium


The Local Best Response Criterion: An Epistemic Approach to Equilibrium Refinement Herbert Gintis May 2, 2008 Abstract
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Document Date: 2008-05-01 20:54:48

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Wilson / Bob / /

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United States / /

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Santa Fe Institute / Central European University / /

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European Science Foundation / Santa Fe Institute / Central European University / /

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Fernando Vega-Redondo / Jeffrey Ely / Bob / Carole / Alice / Larry Samuelson / Robert Aumann / /

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