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 Date: 2014-03-26 06:49:17Game theory Nash equilibrium Cooperative game Core Subgame perfect equilibrium Trembling hand perfect equilibrium Solution concept Subgame Extensive-form game Jean-Franois Mertens Folk theorem Bayesian game |
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