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Auction theory / Game theory / Mechanism design / Auctions / Mathematics / Decision theory / Submodular set function / Competitive equilibrium / Gross substitutes / First-price sealed-bid auction / Auction / Valuation
Date: 2014-02-04 12:07:39
Auction theory
Game theory
Mechanism design
Auctions
Mathematics
Decision theory
Submodular set function
Competitive equilibrium
Gross substitutes
First-price sealed-bid auction
Auction
Valuation

CS364B: Frontiers in Mechanism Design Lecture #7: Submodular Valuations∗ Tim Roughgarden† January 29,

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