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Subgame Nash equilibrium Non-credible threat The Intuitive Criterion Trembling hand perfect equilibrium Strategy Strategic dominance Backward induction Subgame perfect equilibrium Game theory Problem solving Solution concept		Add to Reading List Source URL: gsbapps.stanford.edu Download Document from Source Website Share Document on Facebook

	SUBGAME-PERFECT IMPLEMENTATION UNDER INFORMATION PERTURBATIONS* We consider the robustness of extensive form mechanisms to deviations from common knowledge about the state of nature, which we refer to as information pert DocID: 1sUMm - View Document
	Chapter Three: Static Games* Game-theoretic modeling often begins with the simplest of structures, either in extensive or in normal form. Such simple structures are meant to define the players, their available actions an DocID: 1roEf - View Document
	Discussion Paper NoBelieving when Credible: Talking about Future Plans and Past Actions Karl H. Schlag* Péter Vida** DocID: 1r9KP - View Document
	Selfconfirming Equilibrium and Model Uncertainty∗ P. Battigalli S. Cerreia-Vioglio F. Maccheroni M. Marinacci† July 18, 2013 ∗ DocID: 1qN7p - View Document
	The RAND Corporation Strategic Nonparticipation Author(s): Philippe Jehiel and Benny Moldovanu Source: The RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 27, No. 1 (Spring, 1996), ppPublished by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf DocID: 1qJxb - View Document