An Introduction into Robust Mechanism Design

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Date: 2013-03-19 10:12:07 Mechanism design Social choice theory Problem solving Auction theory Vickrey auction Vickrey–Clarke–Groves auction Science Game theory Auctioneering Economics		An Introduction into Robust Mechanism Design Add to Reading List Source URL: dirkbergemann.commons.yale.edu Download Document from Source Website File Size: 289,12 KB Share Document on Facebook

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