<--- Back to Details
First PageDocument Content
Game theory / Decision theory / Gaming / Nash equilibrium / Folk theorem / Strategy / Trembling hand perfect equilibrium / Subgame / Sequential equilibrium / Equilibrium selection / Correlated equilibrium / Extensive-form game
Date: 2016-07-22 06:27:54
Game theory
Decision theory
Gaming
Nash equilibrium
Folk theorem
Strategy
Trembling hand perfect equilibrium
Subgame
Sequential equilibrium
Equilibrium selection
Correlated equilibrium
Extensive-form game

Course: Game Theory Faculty:

Add to Reading List

Source URL: idea.uab.es

Download Document from Source Website

File Size: 124,71 KB

Share Document on Facebook

Similar Documents

CHARACTERISING EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION IN GLOBAL GAMES WITH STRATEGIC COMPLEMENTARITIES CHRISTIAN BASTECK* ¨ TIJMEN R. DANIELS

DocID: 1vniQ - View Document

CHARACTERISING EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION IN GLOBAL GAMES WITH STRATEGIC COMPLEMENTARITIES CHRISTIAN BASTECK*,◦ ◦ ¨ •

DocID: 1vgvA - View Document

1 I. GS E QUILIBRIUM D ERIVATION AND S ELECTION In this appendix, we first derive the equilibria of the signaling game. Then we apply equilibrium selection criteria. A. Equilibrium Derivation

DocID: 1sXr1 - View Document

CHARACTERISING EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION IN GLOBAL GAMES WITH STRATEGIC COMPLEMENTARITIES CHRISTIAN BASTECK*,◦ ◦ ¨ •

DocID: 1sCNo - View Document

CHARACTERISING EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION IN GLOBAL GAMES WITH STRATEGIC COMPLEMENTARITIES CHRISTIAN BASTECK* ¨ TIJMEN R. DANIELS

DocID: 1rYlJ - View Document