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![]() Date: 2012-09-06 19:36:38Commerce Game theory Vickrey auction Auction First-price sealed-bid auction Spectrum auction Vickrey–Clarke–Groves auction Reverse auction Proxy bid Auctioneering Business Auction theory | Add to Reading List |
![]() | Distributed Implementations of Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanisms David C. Parkes Division of Engineering and Applied Sciences, Harvard University, 33 Oxford Street, Cambridge MA 02138DocID: 1pIsq - View Document |
![]() | Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science year (city), pp. numbers www.stacs-conf.org SPONSORED SEARCH, MARKET EQUILIBRIA, AND THE HUNGARIAN METHOD 1DocID: 1aMb5 - View Document |
![]() | A New Payment Rule for Core-Selecting Package Auctions∗ Aytek Erdil† Paul Klemperer‡DocID: 19pHa - View Document |
![]() | When Does Improved Targeting Increase Revenue? Patrick Hummel R. Preston McAfee Google Inc.DocID: 198ah - View Document |
![]() | Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research–47 Submitted 03/06; publishedComputationally Feasible VCG Mechanisms Noam NisanDocID: 18PAT - View Document |