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Pareto efficiency / Revelation principle / Core / Principal–agent problem / Incentive compatibility / Incentive / Nash equilibrium / Management / Game theory / Economics / Problem solving


Egalitarian Equivalence under Asymmetric Information∗ Geoffroy de Clippel† David P´erez-Castrillo‡
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Document Date: 2012-12-19 16:16:25

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Wilson / Let aB / /

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Israel / /

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pence / /

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Brown University / Tel Aviv University / Ben-Gurion University / /

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corner solutions / insurance contract / transferable utilities / beneficial insurance / cooperative solution / higher interim utilities / /

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Negev / /

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Tel Aviv University / Universitat Aut`onoma de Barcelona / Monaster Center for Economic Research / Department of Economics / National Science Foundation / Brown University / Ben-Gurion University of the Negev / Israeli Science Foundation / Pinchas Sapir Center for Development / /

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