Managerial Compensation and the Cost of Moral Hazard Mary M. Margiotta; Robert A. Miller International Economic Review, Vol. 41, No. 3. (Aug., 2000), ppStable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=%28

Source URL: www.comlabgames.com

American Economic Review 2009, 99:5, 1740–1769 http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=aerHas Moral Hazard Become a More Important Factor in Managerial Compensation? By George-Levi Gayle and Robert A.

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MORAL HAZARD AND THE OPTIMALITY OF DEBT BENJAMIN HÉBERT, HARVARD UNIVERSITY This version: A BSTRACT. Why are debt securities so common? I show that debt securities minimize the welfare losses from the moral haza

Source URL: files.conferencemanager.dk

Repeated Moral Hazard and Recursive Lagrangeans Antonio Mele∗ Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona (Spain) March 2008 PRELIMINARY DRAFT

Source URL: comp-econ.org

Discussion of "Liquidity, Moral Hazard, and Interbank Market Collapse"

Source URL: www.ijcb.org

MORAL HAZARD, INCOME TAXATION, AND PROSPECT THEORY* by Ravi Kanbur Cornell University Jukka Pirttilä# Bank of Finland

Source URL: www.arts.cornell.edu

Collusion, Incentives and Information: The role of Experts in Corporate Governance Sanjay Banerjiyand Tianxi Wangz Abstract The paper shows that the severer moral hazard problems of the CEO and

Source URL: privatewww.essex.ac.uk

A simple test for private information in insurance markets with heterogeneous insurance demand

Source URL: econweb.tamu.edu

• Economy
• Finance
• Money
• Asymmetric information
• Market failure
• Financial risk
• Health insurance
• Adverse selection
• Insurance
• Long-term care insurance
• Moral hazard
• Risk

The (ir)resistible rise of agency rents Bruno Biais, Toulouse School of Economics (CNRS-CRM & PWRI-IDEI) and Augustin Landier, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)1 September 2012

Source URL: www.istfin.eco.usi.ch

• Economy
• Finance
• Money
• Asymmetric information
• Market failure
• Investment
• Financial risk
• Financial markets
• Principalagent problem
• Moral hazard
• Rate of return
• Venture capital

E¢ cient Allocations with Moral Hazard and Hidden Borrowing and Lending: A Recursive Formulation Árpád Ábrahám y and Nicola Pavoni z MayAbstract

Source URL: apps.eui.eu

• Computer programming
• Academia
• Mathematical optimization
• Software engineering
• Equations
• Asymmetric information
• Game theory
• Economic theories
• Contract theory
• Dynamic programming
• Recursion