Back to Results
First PageMeta Content



Modeling Altruism and Spitefulness in Experiments1 David K. Levine2 October 26, 1995 revised October 17, 1997 Abstract: We examine a simple theory of altruism in which players payoffs are linear in
Add to Reading List

Document Date: 1997-10-17 20:01:40


Open Document

File Size: 192,34 KB

Share Result on Facebook

Company

Wilson / /

Event

Person Communication and Meetings / /

Facility

University of Chicago Theory Workshop / Hong Kong University of Science / /

IndustryTerm

ordinary tools / /

Organization

UCLA / the University of Chicago / Department of Economics / National Science Foundation / Hong Kong University of Science and Technology Theory Workshop / MIT / Harvard / University of Chicago Theory Workshop / UCLA Academic Senate / /

Person

Tom Palfrey / Ramon Marimon / John Van Huyck / Rabin / Drew Fudenberg / Isaac / Walker / Robert Rosenthal / /

Position

first player / relatively altruistic player / author / selfish player / model / player / altruistic player / individual player / second player / /

SocialTag