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Game theory / Decision theory / Gaming / Nash equilibrium / Folk theorem / Strategy / Trembling hand perfect equilibrium / Subgame / Sequential equilibrium / Equilibrium selection / Correlated equilibrium / Extensive-form game
Date: 2016-07-22 06:27:54
Game theory
Decision theory
Gaming
Nash equilibrium
Folk theorem
Strategy
Trembling hand perfect equilibrium
Subgame
Sequential equilibrium
Equilibrium selection
Correlated equilibrium
Extensive-form game

Course: Game Theory Faculty:

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