Auctions with a random number of identical bidders

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Date: 2011-10-16 10:21:02 Auction theory Auctions Game theory Mechanism design First-price sealed-bid auction Auction Nash equilibrium All-pay auction Bidding Revenue equivalence		Auctions with a random number of identical bidders Add to Reading List Source URL: faculty.biu.ac.il Download Document from Source Website File Size: 123,52 KB Share Document on Facebook

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