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Business / Mechanism design / Auction / Revelation principle / Routing / First-price sealed-bid auction / Combinatorial auction / Economic model / Reverse auction / Auction theory / Auctioneering / Game theory
Date: 2012-04-15 13:17:03
Business
Mechanism design
Auction
Revelation principle
Routing
First-price sealed-bid auction
Combinatorial auction
Economic model
Reverse auction
Auction theory
Auctioneering
Game theory

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