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Auction theory / Game theory / Business / Marketing / Auction / Generalized second-price auction / Spectrum auction / Combinatorial auction / Vickrey auction / Bidding / Sponsored search auction / First-price sealed-bid auction
Date: 2016-01-25 09:13:39
Auction theory
Game theory
Business
Marketing
Auction
Generalized second-price auction
Spectrum auction
Combinatorial auction
Vickrey auction
Bidding
Sponsored search auction
First-price sealed-bid auction

Algorithmic Game Theory Summer 2015, Week 1 Motivation ETH Zürich

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