Lower Bounds on Revenue of Approximately Optimal Auctions Balasubramanian Sivan1? , Vasilis Syrgkanis2 ??

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Date: 2012-10-01 03:28:30 Auction theory Game theory Auctions Mechanism design Vickrey auction Auction Expected value Gaming Probability distribution		Lower Bounds on Revenue of Approximately Optimal Auctions Balasubramanian Sivan1? , Vasilis Syrgkanis2 ?? Add to Reading List Source URL: people.hss.caltech.edu Download Document from Source Website File Size: 257,41 KB Share Document on Facebook

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