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Date: 2010-09-16 04:58:34 Bank regulation Financial crises Banking Financial risk United States housing bubble Market discipline Systemic risk Too big to fail Moral hazard Economics Finance Financial economics		Add to Reading List Source URL: www.cnb.cz Download Document from Source Website File Size: 137,64 KB Share Document on Facebook

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