The Limits of ex post Implementation

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Date: 2013-10-01 17:14:30 Mechanism design Game theory Mathematics Social choice theory Valuation VickreyClarkeGroves mechanism		The Limits of ex post Implementation Add to Reading List Source URL: www.econ.ucla.edu Download Document from Source Website File Size: 221,93 KB Share Document on Facebook

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