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![]() Date: 2008-12-12 13:03:50Market failure Leonid Hurwicz Socialism Friedrich Hayek Mathematical economics Moral hazard Roger Myerson Mechanism design Risk Economics Economic theories Asymmetric information | Source URL: home.uchicago.eduDownload Document from Source WebsiteFile Size: 99,93 KBShare Document on Facebook |
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