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Mechanism design / Incentive / Mediation / Mathematical economics / Value added tax / Roger Myerson / Price / Futures contract / Nash equilibrium / Economics / Game theory / Revelation principle
Date: 2013-10-18 06:46:27
Mechanism design
Incentive
Mediation
Mathematical economics
Value added tax
Roger Myerson
Price
Futures contract
Nash equilibrium
Economics
Game theory
Revelation principle

Roger B. Myerson - Prize Lecture

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