4.1 Subgame Perfectness In this chapter we will make heavy use of the extensive form to study games with moves that occur in sequence. We start in section 4.1 with a refinement of the Nash equilibrium - Non-credible threat - Document - PDFSEARCH.IO

First Page	Meta Content
	4.1 Subgame Perfectness In this chapter we will make heavy use of the extensive form to study games with moves that occur in sequence. We start in section 4.1 with a refinement of the Nash equilibrium Add to Reading List Document Date: 2009-08-27 17:54:35 Open Document File Size: 129,61 KB Share Result on Facebook Company Wall Street Journal / / Currency pence / / Event Judicial Event / / IndustryTerm good policy maker / legal insurance / / Organization Supreme Court / New York court / Appellate Division / Second Judicial Department / Chicago School / / Person Robert Louis Stevenson / Defendent / Edward M. Cooperman / Sue Offer / / Position economist / Follow-the-Leader / counsel / game Follow-the-Leader / outside counsel / player / qualifier / information qualifier / lawyer / / PublishedMedium Wall Street Journal / / SocialTag Subgame Trembling hand perfect equilibrium Non-credible threat Nash equilibrium Extensive-form game Information set Strategy Best response Outcome Game theory

4.1 Subgame Perfectness In this chapter we will make heavy use of the extensive form to study games with moves that occur in sequence. We start in section 4.1 with a refinement of the Nash equilibriumAdd to Reading List