Theorizing about thinking has become fashionable in economics

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Date: 2003-04-15 10:38:57 Game theory Mathematics Science and technology Science Subgame perfect equilibrium Behavioral game theory Backward induction Battle of the sexes Solution concept Experimental economics Strategy Manipulated Nash equilibrium		Theorizing about thinking has become fashionable in economics Add to Reading List Source URL: people.hss.caltech.edu Download Document from Source Website File Size: 399,73 KB Share Document on Facebook

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