Optimal Crowdsourcing Contests Shuchi Chawla∗ Jason D. Hartline† Abstract

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Date: 2011-05-26 21:52:51 Game theory Vickrey auction Auction All-pay auction Mechanism design First-price sealed-bid auction Reverse auction Bidding function Auction theory Auctioneering Business		Optimal Crowdsourcing Contests Shuchi Chawla∗ Jason D. Hartline† Abstract Add to Reading List Source URL: pages.cs.wisc.edu Download Document from Source Website File Size: 162,66 KB Share Document on Facebook

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