An optimal voting procedure when voting is costly

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Date: 2015-09-30 20:35:02 Social choice theory Game theory Political philosophy Decision theory Politics Public choice theory Psephology Elections Voting system Mechanism design Electronic voting Incentive compatibility		An optimal voting procedure when voting is costly Add to Reading List Source URL: www.econ.ucla.edu Download Document from Source Website File Size: 615,19 KB Share Document on Facebook

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